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INTRODUCTION 
Under what conditions are small-scale farmers able to overcome significant barriers 
to shift into producing organic rice? In a global context, the answers are vital. Rice 
– as with other staple goods – in many areas of the developing world has become 
dependent on chemical fertilizers, causing rapid deterioration in the natural 
environment. Rice grown with chemical fertilizers is less safe to consume. While the 
global environmental imperative justifies conversion (or in most cases, 
reconversion) to the production of organic (or at least safer) rice, the local impact of 
the overuse of chemical fertilizers is just as crucial. Chemical fertilizers create 
lasting effects on the health of local farmers, both in terms of the direct effects from 
the fertilizer’s application, and in terms of the indirect effects the fertilizer has on 
local drinking water. While chemical fertilizers when first introduced can rapidly 
increase rice yields, farmers often find those gains diminishing over time (e.g., 
Tilman et al, 2002). Thus, many farmers experience a vicious cycle – reduced yields 
cause increased chemical fertilizer use. This cycle also causes many farmers to fall 
into debt, as the cost of chemical fertilizers can be high, while both the yields and 
the price of rice tend to fall. Meanwhile, organic rice has a strong international 
certification system and enjoys a price premium. Demand for organic rice is 
stronger and growing. Therefore, the imperatives for shifting into the production of 
organic rice are mounting. 
 
Yet, even as the forces behind the global movement towards organic rice are 
mounting, the barriers to shifting to its production are also high. These include 
numerous technical challenges in producing organic rice, difficulties in accessing 
far-flung domestic and international markets, and market risks. What is more, as 
discussed below, certification agencies have established extensive and dizzyingly 
complex application procedures, and demand that farms must be chemical free for 
a number of years before they are certified as organic. This means that once a 
farmer overcomes these numerous technical and financial challenges, she must 
wait several (between two to four, depending on the agency) seasons before the shift 
can pay off. Moreover, such farmers often find themselves at the mercy of 
middlemen in order to link to more lucrative markets. 
 
Thus, to address this overall puzzle, we compare the puzzling patterns we find in 
the attempts to increase the production of organic rice in five similar provinces in 
the fertile heartland of northeastern Thailand. Like subsistence farmers elsewhere 
in the developing world, small-scale farmers in remote Thai provinces are highly 
reluctant to shift to organic production. Yet, despite the fact that they face similar 
natural, social and political conditions, farmers in some provinces have been 
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markedly more successful in making such a shift. Could provincial governments or 
policy alone be responsible? This is unlikely since Thailand is a highly centralized, 
unitary state, with provincial governors appointed by and beholden to the center; 
tenures tend to be short. Yet in some Thai provinces, such as Surin and Yasothon, 
small-holding farmers have been remarkably successful in upgrading into more 
profitable certified organic production for national and global agricultural markets. 
They receive larger market premiums, are exposed to less risk from fluctuating 
global market prices, and are less dependent on exploitative, informal credit 
markets. In other Thai provinces, like Ubon Ratchathani (which neighbors 
Yasothon) and Sri Saket (which neighbors Surin), farmers remain locked in 
commodity pricing, dependent on informal credit to secure chemical pesticide and 
fertilizer inputs and exposed to wild price fluctuations. Further, a fifth province, 
Amnat Charoen, which borders Ubon Ratchathani and Yasothon, occupies a 
middle position, enjoying a moderate although sporadic pattern of organic rice 
adoption (see Table 1). 
 
Such variation is especially puzzling given the provinces’ similarities. Each are 
located in Isan, the agrarian, traditionally poor region in Thailand’s northeast. The 
provinces’ geographic, demographic and environmental conditions are all similar. 
Could the level of economic development be a factor, with wealthier provinces 
having more wherewithal to shift production to organic rice? Unlikely: the GPP per 
capita (PPP) of all five provinces is nearly identical, and the two most successful in 
organic rice production have lower per capita GDP compared to the least successful 
two. Further, between 2000-2010 (to take a relevant period), neither the provinces’ 
rates of economic growth nor their rates of poverty decline are associated with their 
degrees of success, although the two most successful provinces had the highest 
rate of poverty in 2000, and the fastest percentage point decline in poverty rates. 
Why do we observe such inter-provincial variation in a unitary state where 
agricultural policy is decided by the center? What factors help or hinder farmers 
that wish to upgrade into higher value-added alternative global value chains? 
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 GPP PER 
CAPITA 
(PPP) 20131 
POVERTY 
RATE IN 
2000 
POVERTY 
RATE IN 
2010 
GDP GROWTH 
RATE 2000-2010 
(ANNUAL) 
RELATIVE 
DEGREE OF 
SUCCESS IN 
ORGANIC RICE  
SURIN 5,259 57.8 8.2 10.9 High 
YASOTHON 4,744 46 10.1 10.6 High 
AMNAT 
CHAROEN 
5,067 40.6 8.1 8.6 Medium 
UBON 
RATCHAHANI 
5,306 25.9 8.2 10.2 Low 
SI-SAKET 5,301 40.7 36.1 12.6 Low 
 
                                                          
1 Applies World Bank conversion factor for 2013 
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We attempt to answer these questions by evaluating the ways in which local 
government and civil society (at the local, national, and international levels) can 
support rice farmers in overcoming collective action problems and other major 
barriers associated with upgrading into organic production. Relevant secondary 
literature in any language on these provinces is scant, but we reviewed what there 
was. We examined newspaper reports and other relevant documents from government 
offices, as well as international organizations and national and international non-
government organizations. We spent several days in each of the five provinces, 
interviewing provincial and local government officials, farmers, NGOs, academics, and 
other relevant actors. This allowed us to cross-check our sources and triangulate our 
conclusions.  
 
We believe our results will make important contributions to the academic and policy 
domains. The existing literature that analyzes successful upgrading by farmers 
focuses on the capacities offered by state agencies. We add to this literature by 
investigating the coordinating resources provided by local government and local, 
national, and international non-governmental organizations. While helpful to our 
analysis, the literature comparing global ‘alternative’ value chains and traditional 
commodity chains only broadly identifies the differences between the two. This 
project’s signal contribution is in detailing the unique opportunities and challenges 
associated with these value chains – and critically, the role of civil society and local 
government in fostering successful upgrading. Finally, by identifying ways that 
groups of small farmers can move into more environmentally sustainable, higher-
value added, less risky segments of production, we can help policy makers and civil 
society organizations to maintain social cohesion, reduce poverty, and increase 
quality of life in rural communities. 
THEORY 
UPGRADING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
Moving from chemical to organic agricultural production is a shift to a higher value 
activity that is characterized by more taxing production processes and quality 
standards. Individual farms often lack the ability to make this shift. The literature on 
industrial upgrading notes that, in some circumstances, groups of producers will 
work together and pool their resources in order to overcome key bottlenecks in the 
upgrading process. Such collective action is, of course, also challenging. Indeed, if 
such shifts were easy, the premiums associated with organic production would soon 
disappear. 
 
Global Value Chain analysis has provided a useful framework for conceptualizing the 
role of specific producers within a larger system of production. This general approach 
differentiates between types of value chains (traditionally between buyer-driven and 
producer-driven) and modes of intra-chain governance. Gereffi (2005) specifies five 
modes of governance: market, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy. Upgrading 
in the context of global value chains takes the form of shifting from lower value to 
higher value segments of the chain. 
 
The organic agriculture value chain is described by Raynolds (2004) as a commodity 
‘network’ because of the “complex web of material and non-material relationships 
connecting the social political and economic actors” (Raynolds 2004, 728) involved in 
the activity. In particular, Raynolds notes that, though the standards certification 
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and auditing systems embedded in organic agriculture are decidedly market-based, 
the consumer and producer movements that spawned those systems have non-
market roots. 
 
Concerns about environmental sustainability, food safety, and the lives and 
livelihoods of farmers inform not only the groups that purchase organic foods at a 
market premium. In addition, they also fuel an interconnecting system of local, 
national, and international non-governmental organizations that run parallel to these 
market systems. These networks provide material and information support to 
producers and expand the consumer base for organic products. Any analysis of 
farmers’ attempts to upgrade and incorporate themselves into the organic segment of 
the agriculture value chain would be incomplete without due consideration of this 
parallel network structure. Raynolds, however, only addresses this network in broad 
strokes. It is not clear what roles these organizations perform and what real impact 
they have (if any) upon farmers’ upgrading efforts. Analyses of upgrading within 
traditional global value chains provide some theoretical structure for considering the 
impact of these social networks. 
 
Building on the New Institutional Economics literature, Doner (2009) provides a 
framework for analyzing the nature of collective challenges associated with specific 
upgrading tasks. Tasks are considered more challenging when they feature strong 
distributional consequences, high information requirements, and substantial breadth 
of participation. This offers a useful way of conceptualizing the some of the collective 
challenges associated with upgrading into organic rice production.  
 
Drawing heavily on the development literature, Doner’s analysis is primarily focused 
on the relative capacity of the state to help producers overcome these collective 
challenges. In particular, Doner highlights the ability of the state to facilitate credible 
commitments, monitoring, and consultation among groups of producers. Although 
Doner’s framework doesn’t explicitly consider the ability of local, national, or global 
nongovernmental organizations to facilitate collective action, his conceptual 
categories can be applied to these groups as well.   
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Figure 1: A graphical illustration of Doner’s framework, adapted from (Doner 2009) 
 
Evans (1996) also considers the potential role of civil society in facilitating positive 
developmental outcomes like upgrading. For Evans, strong personal and community 
ties are to be found throughout the developing world. What makes some regions more 
successful at achieving positive outcomes is that some crucial ingredient helped scale 
up this underlying social capital to a level that is efficacious for development (Evans 
1996, 1125). 
 
Like Doner, Evans identifies government as a possible key player in facilitating 
collective action. But here, it needn’t be a coordinated response from a cohesive state 
organization. “Robust, sophisticated public institutions are an advantage both in the 
formation of local social capital and in the pursuit of developmental ends, not 
because they are instruments of centralization but because they are capable of 
formulating more nuanced ways of distributing power and therefore of supporting 
decentralization and openness to local self-organization” (Evans 1996, 1126). Local 
government can, independently or in concert with the center, provide support that 
will help community organizations to scale up. 
 
In combination, these conclusions form a framework useful for analyzing a) the 
challenges associated with upgrading into organic agricultural production; b) the 
potential role of community, provincial, national, and international nongovernmental 
organizations in helping to meet these challenges; and c) the potential role of local 
government in helping community organizations to scale up in order to connect with 
international organizations. This paper contributes to this literature by applying this 
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framework to our puzzling patterns of results concerning the attempts to increase 
organic rice production in five very similar provinces in rural Thailand. 
UPGRADING TASKS IN THE ORGANIC RICE VALUE CHAIN  
On the surface, shifting into organic rice production should be fairly straight forward. 
After all, the natural conditions for organic rice production are present in Isan, and 
farmers there have been successfully producing rice in that region for an unusually 
long period of time. Such farmers have a tradition of producing “organically” at least 
in some form – that is, producing rice before the systematic introduction of chemical 
fertilizer, although nearly everywhere in Isan those traditions were interrupted with 
the rapid increase in chemical fertilizer use. What is more, rice from Isan has an 
international reputation for its high quality. Shouldn’t shifting to organic rice be as 
simple a matter as shifting into any other form of crop? In practice, however, farmers 
attempting to shift into organic rice face a dizzying number of hurdles.  
Building Domestic Markets 
While many small farmers in the developing world produce for their own consumption 
or for the domestic market, demand for organic crops tends to be limited 
domestically. One strategy for upgrading within the organic rice value chain is to 
make an effort to expand domestic demand for their products. As with any industry, 
such a vertical move within a value chain requires the development of substantial 
new capacities. Market research, advertising, branding, advanced quality control, and 
customer service are all capacities that may be quite foreign to farmers who are used 
to delivering unprocessed agricultural commodities to middlemen. It is an effort that 
is typically beyond the resources of individual farms and even small groups of farms.  
To be successful in moving downstream, a large number farms can band together and 
pool their resources. Particularly if they are geographically concentrated or have some 
other clearly distinguishing feature, they can benefit from the development of a 
common reputation. Such a strategy, of course, comes with a number of collective 
action problems.  
The breadth of cooperation in such an endeavor is substantial. In order to scale 
sufficiently to justify expanding their capacity in these areas, large numbers of small 
farmers will be required. Further, whether they are developing a domestic market for 
organic production generally or some sort of regional/group reputation, there will be 
an incentive for free-riding. All organic firms will benefit from an expanded market, 
regardless of whether any individual firm contributes to the expansion of that market. 
For regional/group reputation a similar incentive exists, unless the group develops 
the ability to exclude firms that fail to either contribute or keep sufficient quality. 
Distributional conflicts are less acute with this upgrading task. Losers are primarily 
those producers that invest in expanding the domestic market while their competitors 
free-ride on their efforts. As noted above, the informational requirements of this 
task are quite high given the capacities of typical small farmers.  
Finding International Buyers 
Demand for organic agriculture is strongest in developed countries. Though there is a 
considerable market premium to be had for farmers that grow organic produce, the 
highest value segments of this value chain are held downstream. Individual farmers, 
lacking the scale or capacity to contract directly with global organic buyers, still face 
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a situation where they must accept commodity pricing. Here again, groups of farmers 
can join together to negotiate and fill orders for larger international buyers. 
The breadth of participation here is less extensive than the expansion of domestic 
markets. The grouping only need be sufficiently broad to guarantee the ability to fill 
larger orders by the big buyers. Since this assumes that minimal standards 
certifications have already been met, there is little reason to free-ride here. 
Distributional conflicts are moderate. Group members must be able to resolve 
potential conflicts on priority for filling specific contracts and what happens if a 
member is unable to fill their portion of an order. The informational requirements 
are again moderate. Firms must be keep abreast of the changing demands of global 
buyers and identify possible future buyers. This may mean international travel and 
communication/negotiation in foreign languages. 
Funding Certification and Transition Period 
The standards certification process is costly for small farmers. While the upfront cost 
can be more than made up for if the transition is successful because of the higher 
premiums on organic produce, many simply do not have access to funds to cover the 
initial fee. Likewise, there is a two to four year transition process that farmers must 
go through in order to become certified. During that period, they will not receive the 
market premium associated with organic rice and likely have lower productivity as 
their soil and farming techniques adjust to the new methods. As such, they will likely 
face real financial losses in that period. Both of these problems are made all the 
worse because of the lack formal credit markets at this scale in rural areas.  
Waldner (1999) describes capital accumulation problems such as these as extensive, 
Gershenkronian upgrading tasks, and they can be quite challenging for rural farmers. 
The breadth of participation need not be large for this task; groups must only have 
sufficient scale to reduce the individual farm contribution sufficiently to make it 
affordable. The distributional conflicts associated with this task are high. The 
biggest risk is if the group subsidizes potential members for the certification fees, 
auditing training, and transition process but those members fail to meet or continue 
to comply with the standards. At a minimum, this would mean a loss of the cost of 
the intra group subsidy and at worst it could mean the loss of certification status for 
the group as a whole. The informational requirements here are significant because 
of the mismatch between the auditing compliance capacities required to become 
certified and the capabilities of farmers with low levels of formal education and little 
exposure to such processes (Raynolds 2004). Moreover, even the ability to understand 
and fill in the form can be a challenge for subsistence farmers. 
Milling Capacity 
Within rice production there is a significant distributional conflict between rice 
growers and millers. Those engaged in the more capital-intensive milling process have 
traditionally been able to use market power to pressure individual farmers into 
accepting lower prices for their outputs. Since certified organic auditing processes 
require dedicated milling of organic rice, millers have even more potential power to 
demand a larger portion of the organic production surplus, leading to less incentive 
for individual farms to shift into organic production. As with funding for certification, 
this is largely a financial problem, but the distributional conflicts may be higher if 
existing millers try to exert political or financial pressure on groups who are looking 
to invest in dedicated organic milling capacity.  
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UPGRADING 
TASK 
INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
BREADTH OF 
PARTICIPATION 
DISTRIBUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS 
COST OF 
TRANSITION & 
CERTIFICATION 
High - codified 
but technical 
relative to prior 
education 
Moderate -  High – 
consequences for 
failure  
GLOBAL BUYERS Low – cost of 
identifying global 
buyers, language, 
demonstrating 
quality 
Moderate – too expensive 
for individual 
cooperatives, even 
groups of cooperatives 
Moderate – potential 
for middle men 
attitudes 
BUILDING 
DOMESTIC 
BRAND 
High – new 
skillsets 
High – establish 
local/provincial/national 
reputation requires 
quality control 
Moderate  
MILLS Low Moderate – requires 
multiple groups to 
achieve scale 
High 
SKILL TRANSFER 
– ORGANIC 
FARMING 
Moderate - Place 
specific 
Moderate – requires 
multiple groups to 
achieve scale 
Low 
Table 2: Barriers to each upgrading task 
CASES 
The five provinces were chosen based on the dependent variable: the varying degree 
to which they produce organic rice. As noted in Table 1, among the provinces in Isan, 
Yasothon and Surin are unusually successful in shifting to organic rice, Ubon 
Ratchathani and Sri Saket are stand-out failures, while Amnat Charoen occupies a 
space in the middle.  
YASOTHON 
Yasothon’s success in increasing organic rice production was undergirded by farmers 
groups – about half of which were formed in the 1970s. When national-level NGOs 
tried to promote organic rice, they found in these farmers groups fertile and pre-tilled 
soil on which to build. In other places, activists are compelled to talk to farmers on an 
individual basis; in Yasothon, their effort was more effective. Farmers groups already 
had some strengths and capabilities, to which such NGOs could complement and 
supplement. This combination of NGO + farmer group effort helped to spur organic 
rice, an initiative that reached a plateau until an activist CEO governor added his 
efforts to the movement.  
Currently there are 10 active farmer groups focusing on organic rice. Each of these 
has substantially different stories, but eight of the ten share two common 
characteristics: they started as informal farmer groupings that formed as farmers 
sought to reduce exploitation and avoid middleman, and they received substantial 
support from Thai NGOs. The remaining two were formed as offshoots of the original 
groups, splitting into two as they grew too large. 
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Farmers Group A 
In the mid-1970s, farmers from several neighboring farms became alarmed as they 
faced high chemical costs, declining land productivity due to the intensive use of 
chemical fertilizers, and declining global rice prices. Moreover, farmers selling rice 
individually were dependent on middlemen and rice millers and subject to 
exploitation. These external factors meant that, despite consistent hard work, more 
and more farmers were going into debt. Facing these deteriorating conditions, these 
neighboring farms joined together in Farmers Group A to pool their resources and 
meet these challenges head on. 
Local civic leaders took the lead to coordinate their efforts and give the group 
direction. They first freed themselves from exploitative middlemen by joint selling 
their (chemically produced) rice in order to secure better terms. By the mid-1990s, 
the group had expanded in size. With help from the district-level department of 
agriculture, they arranged funds to purchase a “Community Rice Mill,” that would 
allow farmers to command even higher prices. As a cooperative, all profits would be 
split amongst the members, or in one year, used to expand the mill’s capacity. This 
group eventually became the province’s largest One Tambon One Product (OTOP) 
producer.2  
Farmer Group A’s long history of cohesion and cooperation helped them to develop 
the capacity to shift into organic rice production. They were aided in this effort by 
GreenNet, a national-level environmental NGO. GreenNet helped farmers prepare for 
and achieve different levels of national and international organic rice certification. 
GreenNet provided invaluable technical advice and training, and was the key market 
to most of these groups. For instance, in 1995, GreenNet brought 100 percent of one 
group’s organic rice production, providing for farmers an unusually stable market. 
Representatives of this farmer group applaud the efforts of GreenNet and other 
national NGOs for helping them to connect farmers with larger external markets. This 
cooperative remains a combination of organic and non-organic rice farmers, and 
among those rice farmers, different ones have levels of certification. However, the mill 
is able to handle both kinds of rice, and all the farmers still cooperate effectively. 
While the cooperative continues to practice group sales and procurement, it has 
stopped procuring chemical fertilizers on behalf of its members. Yet not is all smooth 
for this Farmer Group, which like others in Yasothon, faces many challenges. 
Competition is increasingly fierce, and group leaders struggle to adjust. Although 
farmers within the farmer group share in the profits, they are free to use any mill they 
want; the mill owned by the farmers group must constantly attract their farmers to 
use their mills so they can keep up with orders.  
Farmer Group B 
In Farmer Group B, farmers and local community groups worked together to form the 
farmers’ cooperative under the direction of local civic leaders. They built on a close 
relationship with a national farmer support NGO, the Love Nature club. Cooperative B 
leaders underscore two key ways that Love Nature contributed to the effort to shift 
into organic rice. First, the NGO provided a deep level of technical services, including 
testing and experimentation, comparing experiences in other provinces, sharing 
                                                          
2 OTOP is a program to promote local entrepreneurship in sectors that make use of traditional 
knowledge and local inputs so as to encourage rural capital formation, community integrity, 
and less outmigration. 
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knowledge among local farmers, and inviting technical experts from overseas. Second, 
they helped with the auditing for certification, including technical advice, and 
providing payment for the certification application. Furthermore, LoveNature helped 
with production, packaging and marketing of the organic rice. By the 1980s, Farmer 
Group B had established its own organic rice mill. 
Farmer Group C 
Organic rice production was part of a larger, religious-based initiative to produce 
“moral rice” for Farmer Group C. The standards for joining this group far transcends 
“merely” adhering to the exacting technical requirements of growing organic rice. To 
become a member, a farmer must live an upstanding life, closely adhering to the 
doctrines of Buddhism, foregoing alcohol and meat, speaking truthfully, and 
refraining from gambling. The certification standards for group membership were 
inspired by a Buddhist monk, who acted as spiritual leader. With its own certification 
process, Farmer Group C has created a system through which members in the earlier 
stages of shifting to organic rice production – those who have not yet qualified for 
official certification – can nevertheless command some form of premium for their rice, 
smoothing the way for farmers to make that transition. Moral rice has the potential to 
serve as a further point of market differentiation for their group, particularly 
domestically. Group members interviewed indicate that they were able to secure a 
premium on top of the overall organic market premium.  
Farmer Group C was exceptional in not working with national NGOs – other groups 
found such involvement essential to the process of shifting to organic rice production. 
This points to a further question: how did groups like GreenNet and LoveNature get 
involved in the first place? GreenNet understood Yasothon’s reputation for growing 
high quality (non-organic) Jasmine rice, so they chose the province as fertile ground 
in their efforts to expand organic rice. These pre-established farmers group greatly 
facilitated GreenNet’s ability to help Yasothon expand into organic rice production. 
While they did not work with national NGOs, Farmer Group C did work closely with 
other organic cooperatives in Yasothon, helping one another to fill large orders and 
consult with provincial and municipal government to relate the specific needs of 
organic agriculture in the area.  
Other Cooperatives in Yasothon 
In this way, by 1987, 4 or 5 such groups of approximately 50 farmers each had been 
established, which served as a foundation for a shift into organic rice. Farmers, NGOs 
and even government officials all agree that the initial impetuous towards organic rice 
was from these farmer groups (with the assistance of a Thai NGO), and the initial role 
of provincial or national government was minimal. Interviewers also agree that one 
key characteristic was that the groups were well connected with each other – if one 
group had a problem, other groups would provide advice and support. They had 
sufficient resources to bring in outside technical experts to help with problem solving. 
While most farmer groups in Yasothon consist of both organic and nonorganic rice 
producers, the non-organic rice producers tend to use less chemical fertilizers 
compared to other rice farmers.  
Even though this constellation of actors – farmers working with NGOs – had 
succeeded in forming a number of groups, organic rice production in Yasothon had 
reached a plateau. Like farmers in most other provinces in Isan (Amnat Charoen is an 
exception), Yasothon rice farmers in the province outside these groups had long been 
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using chemical fertilizer and were thus resistant to producing organic rice. Other 
farmers were not organizing together as those in the initial groups had. And without 
such groups to work with, outside NGOs had difficulty finding partners to support.  
Role of Provincial Government  
However, 16 years after these groups’ initial formation, the Yasothon provincial 
government started to take a major role. Empowered by Thaksin’s CEO governor 
model and passionate about organic rice (the account regarding the governor differs – 
at least one farmer group leader suggested that he was pushed by civil society to 
support organic rice production), Governor Sutinabun was key to further promoting 
organic rice production. Since some of these groups had already been operating for 
16 years, and had already had support of national-level NGOs, the governor was 
advantaged by having a thick network of civil society with which to work. Thus, his 
goal was two-fold: to use the resources and power of government to nurture and 
expand these groups, and to spread these groups to other areas of Yasothon. He used 
financial resources to increase the number of members, provide deeds and bring in 
outside technical advisors. He secured funding for a small mill for at least one of the 
groups.  
Governor Sutinabun also implemented an innovative policy that helped overcome the 
problem related to the delay between organic rice production and certification. For 
farmers that were unwilling or unable to meet the strict standards needed for 
certification, the governor created a middle category – ‘safe agriculture’ – for which 
farmers hoping to reduce the use of chemical fertilizers could aspire. If chemical 
fertilizers could not be eliminated everywhere, more farmers could be persuaded and 
supported to use less chemical fertilizer and use it more effectively – applying it at 
precisely the right time and with the right procedures to maximize its impact. This 
allowed the government to establish a large group of ‘safe farmers’ who could, over 
time, eventually shift into full organic farming. Although safe farming practices did 
not come with the certification needed to command the higher prices fetched by 
organic rice, the material benefits drawn by using less chemicals and achieving 
greater yields were nevertheless an incentive. Although his tenure in Yasothon only 
lasted a few years, Governor Sutinabun still served longer than most governors in 
Thailand. Moreover, he was able to work with a well-established set of passionate and 
experienced farmers, which made his efforts much more efficient. The pre-existing 
groups were deeply involved in the government-sponsored campaign to show other 
farmers how to produce organic rice. Through these efforts, the number of safe and 
organic farmers increased markedly. The number of groups of organic farmers 
increased to 10, involving 2,000 total members and 40,000 rai of farmland.  
While the number of both safe and organic farmers increased markedly over the 
Sutinabun administration, he was replaced by governors who, government officials 
emphatically suggested, ‘watched organic rice from a distance.’ During this period, 
the number of groups and organic rice farmers once again plateaued, and these 
groups were once again challenged by the barriers to expanding without government 
assistance. However, in 2015, with the central initiative to producing organic rice, the 
present provincial government is once again serious about organic rice. The Yasothon 
government has played a number of roles in this regard: it has provided financial 
support for expanding the number of organic rice producers and increasing the land 
on which organic rice is produced. According to government officials, whereas the 
2015 goal was to expand production by 4,500 rai, the have already exceeded that 
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goal, expanding production by 8,000 rai. These farmer groups willingly worked with 
the government – for instance, they used experienced members of groups to teach 
and otherwise support new groups. Moreover, Bangkok has established Yasothon as 
the singular role model for organic rice production for all other provinces desiring to 
expand organic rice production. The provincial government’s current plan is even 
more ambitious: to add 100,000 rai, and 450 new members each year. The 
government also hopes to use the national and international marketing linkages 
established through organic rice production to produce other forms of organic 
agriculture. Meanwhile, many farmer groups are encouraging farmers to expand from 
organic rice to producing other organic goods.  
SURIN 
Surin farmers have been singularly successful in shifting into organic rice. According 
to data from the Ministry of Commerce’s Organic Marketing Intelligence Center (n.d.), 
Surin province accounts for two-thirds of all Isan farmers engaged in cultivating 
‘‘Hom Mali” certified organic rice (by far the most common form of Thai organic rice). 
The province also accounts for half of the total area planted and just over half the 
total production area in the region. With so many producers directly engaged in 
organic farming and more employed in supporting industries including food 
processing, this represents a major boon to smallholder farmers in the province. 
Through producers’ efforts, Surin Hom Mali Organic Jasmine Rice has emerged as a 
globally known brand of quality organic rice. A 2006 Asian Development Bank study 
found that certified organic farmers in Surin, Ubon Ratchathani, and Yasothon 
provinces sold their rice at nearly double the price of conventional rice producers 
(Setboonsarng, Leung, and Cai 2006). Other studies have found similar premiums 
associated with certified organic production (Morawetz, Wongprawmas, and Haas 
2007), particularly for farms involved in the Fair Trade Network (Becchetti, Conzo, 
and Gianfreda 2012).  
Role of provincial civil society 
 
As with Yasothon, Surin’s success in developing organic rice was caused by a 
combination of a strong, local farmers associations linked with national and 
international non-government organizations, and the role of a governor who was 
unusually vigorous and committed to promoting organic rice. Over the last twenty 
years, Surin has developed a vibrant civil society that interacted dynamically with the 
provincial government to help micro-developmental initiatives succeed by facilitating 
collective action among farmers and entrepreneurs. Whereas in Yasothon’s case, the 
initiative came from farmers groups, in Surin’s case, the impetus can be traced to the 
many Thailand’s university students who traveled upcountry to conduct experiential 
fieldwork on the living conditions of rural Thais. The 1976 massacre at Thammasat 
University and subsequent crackdowns by the Thanin government further drove large 
numbers of these communitarian-minded students to take refuge with the 
Communist Party of Thailand in remote jungle areas. The Cambodian border near 
Surin and Si-Saket became one of the key areas for these groups (Girling 1985; Keyes 
1995). Even after the government granted an amnesty in the 1980s, many of these 
former student leaders remained upcountry and initiated locally oriented 
development projects (Parnwell 2007; Phatharathananunt 2002). Around the same 
time, large numbers of refugees from Cambodia fled to Surin, where international and 
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non-government organizations placed them into organized camps. The area became a 
hub for local and international NGOs providing services for the refugees. Many of 
these NGOs also provided services to locals and continued operating after the camps 
were closed down (Shigetomi 2009). 
This combination of committed, locally embedded leaders with substantial experience 
and networks of local, national, and international contacts resulted in a vibrant civil 
society throughout Surin province. Not only did these activists establish and manage 
local initiatives to fight poverty and foster community solidarity, some were influential 
in the evolution of the ‘‘community culture” neolocalist movement. Even in a region 
characterized by NGO activism, Surin’s rich networks of NGOs were remarkable. As 
one scholar concluded, ‘‘compared with other provinces, Surin had ample NGO 
resources,” (Shigetomi 2009, 66). One NGO director in Si-Saket put it even more 
emphatically, remarking that Surin became the ‘‘NGO capital of Isan” (Interview 14). 
Political events in the early 1990s caused NGOs to become even more closely 
networked in Surin. In 1990, the military instituted Khor Jor Kor, a forestry program 
designed to reorganize land use in the country’s national forest reserves. The policy, 
which would have displaced thousands of families to make room for commercial 
plantations, garnered widespread opposition among people in Isan and motivated 
communitarian NGOs to mobilize and coordinate their activities to protect farmers’ 
interests. A civil disobedience campaign emerged and grew steadily until mass 
demonstrations led to the cancelation of the program in 1992. This campaign 
coincided with protests to eject General Suchinda from the premiership in 1992 
(Shigetomi 2009). Both had a lasting impact on this network of rural community 
activists. 
In Surin, a senior activist created the Surin Forum as a space for members of civil 
society—including NGO staff, farmers, teachers, and even business people—to meet 
and exchange ideas about public issues (Shigetomi 2009). Over the course of the 
1990s, this group of professionals and activists gradually formed a semi-formal 
network that often worked directly with government and international institutions to 
promote community development in Surin. Its capacity improved gradually as it 
developed administrative capabilities and a professional staff.  
The groups that had formed in the 1980s helped encourage and facilitate the shift to 
growing organic rice in a number of key ways. First, they provided important training 
and education. Smallholder farmers began exploring the possibility of transitioning to 
organic agriculture in the early 1990s. Concerned about illness related to pesticides, 
fluctuating market prices, and indebtedness, farmers in Surin formed the Natural 
Agriculture Group (NAG) in 1992, with the assistance of NGOs like Surin Farmer 
Support (SFS). These organizations help farmers to identify and begin to disseminate 
a set of best practices for organic farming. Over the next 20 years a wide array of 
nongovernmental organizations developed to assist smallholder farmers engaged in 
organic agriculture. Organizations such as SFS and the Organic Rice Fund in Surin 
trained farmers in the use of organic farming processes and organic fertilizers 
(Woranoot 2009). 
Second, these organizations helped to solve distributional conflicts between 
distributors, processors, middlemen, and farmers have the potential to develop 
between upstream and downstream segments of the agricultural supply chain. For 
example, conflicts between sugar cane producers and millers over the costs of 
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resolving bottlenecks and the equitable distribution of profits presented a major 
challenge to that sector throughout the 1980s (Doner 2009). Many rice farmers had 
substantial experience with a middleman system which limited the agency of farmers 
(Sukpanich 2003). The NAG was established specifically to counter the power that 
traders and mill owners had over the prices paid to farmers (Chamontri 2009, 32). 
Many collective organic farmers groups in Surin, such as the NAG, the Prasart 
Cooperative, and Bua Kok organic Hom Mali rice producer, helped to overcome 
upstream–downstream conflicts by purchasing and operating their own mills 
(Chamontri 2009, 32). Third, this dense network of NGOs helped connect smallholder 
farmers to the international market. For instance, they have reached out to 
international NGOs to market their organic products, which helped them sell Fair 
Trade rice to Europe and the United States (Bangkok Post 2005). These organizations 
also helped farmers comply with the standards certification bodies such as the 
Organic Agriculture Certification of Thailand and the Surin Province Organic 
Certification. NGO leaders suggested that this training was especially important 
because compliance with strict international certification auditing procedures is 
particularly onerous for farmers with little formal education (Interview 30). 
Role of provincial government 
These efforts began attracting official support. As early as 2000, Surin provincial 
governor Kasemsak Sanpote made it clear that the facilitation of Surin organic rice 
was among his top priorities. He stressed the important role of local civil society in 
fostering the development of organic agriculture, ‘‘The work has been established on a 
large scale. . . There are quite a number of persons in Surin who are highly respected 
for their long advocacy of alternative and organic farming. Some have networks in 
foreign countries where they sell their produce. The farmers only need the knowledge 
and the belief.” (Sukpanich, 2003). Indeed, prior to becoming governor, Kasemsak 
had been influenced by ‘‘local wisdom” leader and integrated farming advocate Maha 
Yoo Soonthornchai, as well as integrated farming community organizer Eiad Depoon 
(Interviews 19, 25). 
Governor Kasemsak’s championing of the organic agriculture cause brought official 
state recognition and support to the dense network of civil society organizations. 
Provincial agencies helped to coordinate the activities of organized civil society. These, 
in turn, were especially proactive. Even as local NGOs developed a training 
curriculum based on Thai and international experience, the provincial government 
helped secure funds to build capacity and provided training centers at local schools. 
Meanwhile, local ‘‘development monks,” led by Surin’s Abbot Nan, spread the word 
about the moral and material benefits of the practices and helped secure additional 
training at local temples (Interviews 19, 25). 5 His efforts also reinforced many of the 
NGO’s initiatives, including helping them extend their reach into the international 
market place. For instance, the governor held brand-marketing workshops to gather 
ideas from operators of rice mills, agriculture cooperatives, farmers groups, and 
related state bodies (Thai News Service 2005). PM Thaksin lauded the scale of the 
provincial administration’s efforts, noting, ‘‘Surin provincial authorities taught 34,000 
farmers about organic farming with a budget of over 10 million Baht from Tambon 
administration organizations” (Bangkok Post. 2001). In this way, Governor Kasemsak 
was able to serve as the bridge between the locally led development approach that 
had flourished among civil society groups in Surin and the national government. 
Moreover, Kasemsek also worked directly with NGOs, sitting on the board, for 
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example, of Surin Net Foundation, one of the largest community development NGOs 
in the province (Interviews 19, 25, 33).  
AMNAT CHAROEN 
In contrast to the experiences of Yasothon and Surin, the expansion of organic rice 
production in the province of Amnat Charoen has been driven almost single-handedly 
by farmers cooperatives or other provincial-level farmers groups. As relayed by 
farmers and others involved in this effort, in the past, organic rice farmers were easily 
exploited because they were compelled to sell their rice to middlemen in other 
provinces or to agribusinesses. Farmers enjoyed few protections if the buyers 
suddenly chose to change the price or otherwise used their market power to exploit 
the farmer. The effort to organize ways to circumvent this form of exploitation also 
started later than the efforts seen in Yasothon and Surin. 
One of four main networks of organic farmers groups in Amnat Charoen, the “Truth 
Rice” network is seeking new, technology-enabled means of expanding the domestic 
demand base for organic rice. Working closely with NGOs in Bangkok, they directly 
connect the farmer to the buyer. The groups tried to link farmers together, eventually 
linking 27 cooperatives involving 400 farmers and 7,000 rai. Each of these 
cooperatives operate in somewhat different ways, but all try to circumvent the 
middlemen. Yet even as local groups can help farmers eliminate the middleman in 
marketing, these small scale farmers have been challenged with securing milling 
services. Nowadays, however, each of the 27 cooperatives has its own mills – most are 
small or medium scale, although one large mill owner allows organic rice farmers to 
use his mill, as well as space to store their grain, which he sees as a part of his 
corporate social responsibility. Thus, organic rice production in Amnat Charoen was 
much more bottom up than any other province. But the fact that such farmers had 
little support from outside NGOs or the government limited the spread of organic rice. 
Farmers and farmers cooperatives were left to overcome obstacles to producing 
organic rice successfully – including finding their own markets outside the province. 
For example, one local farmer group within the “Truth Rice” network was established 
by an organic rice farmer who was passionate about improving rice quality with the 
aim of getting IFOAM certification for Amnat Charoen farmers. Moreover, he contacts 
end users directly, making contacts with large hotel chains or MNC restaurants that 
are willing to support farmers, and at least initially willing to try to make direct 
purchases. Farmers face many difficulties in coming into compliance with the strict 
exacting standards needed for IFOAM certification. However, by connecting with Thai-
based end consumers, this farmer-led provincial-level NGO is able to provide its own 
monitoring and certification services to reassure these companies that the rice they 
are purchasing have reached some standard of organic production. This ability to 
earn more money sooner from producing organic rice encourages more farmers to 
want to participate.  
These efforts were greatly facilitated by a cultural aspect of Amnat Charoen’s farmers. 
According to local farmers and NGOs, farmers in Amnat Charoen have not lost the 
knowledge of some forms of chemical-free rice production. One provincial community 
organization, led by former members of the communist movement in the region, have 
long prioritized traditional, non-chemical agricultural activities -even if they have not, 
until recently labeled them as organic. This organization, with deep penetration into 
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villages throughout the province, has made ‘nature agriculture’ one of several pillars 
of community development.  
Moreover, whereas other provinces in Isaan – even successful organic rice producing 
provinces such as Yasothon – were inundated with chemical fertilizer, Amnat 
Charoen farmers resisted. Given the costs for chemical fertilizer and its impact on 
health and the environment, the typical Amnat Charoen farmer concluded that the 
use of chemical fertilizer was not worth the cost. This logic undergirded a culturally 
traditional form of rice production that did not depend on the overuse of chemical 
fertilizers. In turn, it facilitated efforts of farmers cooperatives to support farmers who 
want to produce organic rice. Whereas organic rice production in Surin and Yasothon 
were greatly facilitated by hands-on “CEO governors” who served during the Thaksin 
administration, Amnat Charoen had no such advantage. As one activist underscored 
the point: Amnat Charoen’s farmers cultural attitudes put them into a position to 
respond directly to Thaksin’s calls to shift to organic rice – or at least safer forms of 
rice production – even though that encouragement was mainly from a distance.  
The role of the provincial government in Amnat Charoen has not been completely 
absent. For instance, NGOs note that in recent years, the provincial government 
noticed that many of the groups were scattered and thus had trouble supporting each 
other. They tried to organize meetings between these groups to allow them to 
exchange ideas and information. The government provided venues for these talks. 
Farmers here also exchange ideas with neighboring Yasothoni farmers. Even more 
recently, starting in 2015, the government has started providing funds to pay for the 
certification process. Yet, compared to the government in Yasothon and Surin, the 
role of the government in Amnat Charoen has been relatively passive, as even 
government officials readily acknowledge. 
SI-SAKET 
 
Many farmers in Si-Saket have also moved into organic farming; though the 
province’s organic output is significantly lower than that of Surin province, it is 
nevertheless one of Thailand’s top producers of organic rice. What distinguishes Si-
saket however is that little of the organic rice production is certified, despite the 
province’s larger overall agricultural sector. The director of one NGO in Si-Saket 
indicated that some communities have local markets for ‘‘green” agriculture but these 
are unconnected, feature no systematic certification process, and tend to be for local 
consumption (Interview 46). To the extent that large-scale organic production does 
occur in Si-Saket, it is undertaken by members of the Santi Asoke religious group. 
This Buddhist sect maintains the entire value chain, from fertilizer to cultivation to 
milling to packaging to sales. The group is not market oriented and uses (uncertified) 
organic production methods because they are in line with their beliefs rather than to 
gain the market premium associated with organic agriculture (Ellis and Panyakul 
2006; Alexander H. Kaufman 2012). Thus, although comparative analyses of organic 
agriculture in Thailand often make note of the Asoke group in Si-Saket (Chamontri, 
2009; Ellis et al., 2006; Patrawart, 2009), its impact on local poverty is largely limited 
to members of the religious group, and even that impact is muted.   
Civil society in Si-Saket, by comparison, remained fragmented and had little 
connection with the development of organic rice in the province. Though many local 
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organizations exist at the village and municipality level in Si-Saket, we found no 
province-wide organizations that coordinated activities and provided organic 
certification training and capacity building to farmers. No community organizers or 
academics that we interviewed in the region could identify any NGOs performing 
these functions (e.g., interviews 15, 21, 33, 39). Santi Asoke does provide some 
training in working without pesticides and chemical fertilizers and manages the 
value-chain for those that choose to produce for their network, including rice mills. 
Yet, because the organization does not seek to profit from their operations and so do 
not seek to certify or sell to global markets, Santi Asoke has limited impact 
(Chamontri 2009; Alexander Harrow Kaufman and Mock 2014) just as is the case in 
Ubon Ratchathani. Governor Thanom Songserm did attempt to promote organic 
agriculture in the province in 2003 (Dayley 2011), but his efforts proved short-lived 
since he served less than two years in office and he had scant interlocutors in civil 
society.  
UBON RATCHATHANI 
 
While Ubon Ratchathani farmers are prolific producers of Jasmine rice, it has been 
unsuccessful in spurring organic rice production. So far, the attempts to shift 
ordinary farmers into organic rice production have been relatively recent, sporadic, 
and uncoordinated, and the results have been disappointing. Based on our research, 
efforts to expand organic rice production have emerged from three isolated sources: 
Asoke 
 
Like Si-Saket, a leading producer of organic rice in Ubon Ratchathani is Asoke, the 
Buddhist sect dedicated to living based on their interpretation of Buddhism. Sect 
members maintain an austere and principled lifestyle, including following strictly the 
principals of organic farming – using no chemical fertilizers or pesticides. Since 1994, 
seven or eight Asoke groups have conducted farming in Ubon Ratchathani in this 
way. Interviews with Asoke members in one of the larger Asoke bases in the province 
revealed that farmers there are growing exclusively and strictly organic agriculture in 
several commodities. Of their total area of 700 rai, some 400 farmers, divided into 
production teams focusing on different organic products, farm on around half the 
total area. Not all Asoke devotees live inside an organized community – many 
members are farmers outside the base, but must live in accord with Asoke’s 
principals. Although Asoke leaders will enforce these principals on its members, it is 
rare for people to be disbanded from the group, since most truly intend to follow.  
Thus, Asoke is a major actor in the production of organic rice in Ubon Ratchathani. 
Yet despite its single-minded devotion to organic agriculture and its goal of 
proselytizing people into their particular interpretation of Buddhism, the group does 
not aspire to spread organic agriculture per se outside its community. Like their 
counterparts in Si-Saket, interaction between the sect and the outside world is 
minimal. Indeed, self-sufficiency is one of their primary goals; they do not seek any 
form of organic certification, and sell organic products to the outside only on an ad 
hoc basis.  
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Thai military 
 
In the late 1990s, a commander in the Thai military began to worry that farmers in 
the areas bordering Laos were not conducting farming in what he saw as the correct 
way. This unusually dedicated military leader taught Japanese composting and 
organic fertilizer practices to these farmers, helping them shift into organic rice 
production. The result was successful. After five years of production, this “No 
Chemical Cooperative” of farmers has been certified as organic producers. Within the 
network, farmers give each other advice and knowledge. However, the effects of this 
was limited to this narrow group, and few attempts were made to expand this base of 
organic rice production.  
Local activists 
 
Compared to other provinces we studied, there are relatively few NGOs who are active 
in the area. One key characteristic of non-government efforts to expand organic rice 
production is that it appears to be primarily driven not by farmers but by urban-
based activists. In Surin, Yasothon and Amnat Charoen, farmers themselves had 
formed groups – largely to reduce exploitation from middlemen – with which NGOs 
could subsequently work to promote organic rice production. By contrast, NGOs in 
Ubon Ratchathani, while passionate, are small in number, and struggle to convince 
individual farmers about the merits of organic rice production, let alone to organize 
farmers groups. The ability of outside NGOs to promote organic rice production in 
Ubon Ratchathani is similarly constrained.  
For example, one of the leading lights promoting organic rice production in Ubon 
Ratchathani is an energetic journalist/activist. Five years ago, she launched a 
popular TV show, loosely translated as “Eat Without Worry,” which promotes 
healthier diets and lifestyles. The program has become popular, and is viewed widely 
on YouTube. Through the television program, she also sought to work with the 
government, consumers and the private sector to promote organic agriculture. To this 
end, in 2015 she approached a shopping mall to obtain space to establish a Green 
Market. Open once a week, the green market is open to any farmer with organic 
produce. In order to circumvent the problems related to the lengthy approvals period 
for organic certification, this activist has established her own certification system 
based on her own inspections, essentially using her own credibility as an activist and 
celebrity to reassure consumers that these farmers are using organic methods of 
farming.  
Her group has also worked closely with her counterparts in the two leading lights for 
organic rice production, Surin and Yasothon, to learn from these pioneering provinces 
their best practices regarding establishing a Green Market and promoting organic 
rice. However, she finds that Ubon Ratchathani’s relatively comparatively large 
geographic area makes spreading organic production difficult. Albeit newly launched, 
a visit revealed a disappointingly small scale - with about a dozen farmers selling 
organic products of various kinds. Although we visited during the weekend in the 
early afternoon, the customer base appeared small.  
A second such activist is a professor at Ubon Ratchathani University who in 2013 
secured a four-year grant from an EU-based fund that aimed to increase organic food 
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production and reduce climate change. This academic subsequently worked diligently 
to convince farmers to shift into organic farming. Preliminary research concluded two 
trends justified increasing organic rice production: first, changes in rainfall pattern 
has reduced production of rice, and second, government policy has put downward 
pressure on the price of rice. The goal of the program was to help farmers through the 
process of shifting to organic rice production, and helping them obtain iFOAM 
certification. Despite toiling for the past three years to reach out to farmers, the 
results have been disappointing. These visits are extremely labor-intensive and 
convincing farmers to shift to organic rice has been quite challenging. Farmers had 
become accustomed to using chemical fertilizer and had forgotten or neglected the 
traditional practices that are necessary for organic pest control. A second barrier was 
the lack of a distribution channel – the academic identified this as her main 
challenge. Moreover, because her initiative is not linked a rice mill, her farmers could 
only command a modestly higher price – they were unable to obtain the added value 
that comes from processing their own rice. Subsequently the academic purchased a 
small mill in order to cut out the middleman.  
Now with the end of her grant approaching, although she has worked intensely with 
approximately 400 farmers, her cooperative contains a modest 80 farming families 
growing organic rice on about 1600 rai. While she describes her organization as a 
cooperative, the organization’s form does not resemble that of a traditional 
cooperative. These farmers are spread across eight districts, far from each other, and 
thus are not able to support each other as well as neighbors might. The distance 
between farmers reduces their ability to transmit knowledge, and engage in joint 
purchase of inputs and sales of product difficult. Moreover, the cooperative is 
designed to engender trust and mutual support between farmers, which is much 
more difficult when farmers live so far apart from each other. The cooperative’s ability 
to empower farmers is thus limited. Meanwhile, the organization faces a number of 
dilemmas. In 2014, the organization faced a serious cash flow problem – farmers 
want to be paid immediately, whereas customers want to pay after delivery. Thus in 
2015, the organization found customers who were willing to pay for organic rice in 
advance. Yet, unfortunately, the cooperatives total production that year was much 
less than anticipated, disappointing the customers who were expecting – and had 
already paid for – a greater volume of rice. These setbacks rendered convincing more 
farmers to join the cooperative even more challenging. Moreover, now that her grant 
has ended (though it was extended by six months), the academic worries that 
cooperative leaders may not yet be prepared to sacrifice their own time to provide 
leadership and other public goods for the cooperative or possess sufficiently honed 
skills needed manage the organization on their own.  
As noted, these activists have just begun the process of promoting organic rice in 
Ubon Ratchathani. Moreover, there efforts, although from civil society, appear to be 
more or less top-down, with little initiative from farmers. In Amnat Charoen, 
Yasothon and Surin provinces, much of the success has been from farmer-initiated 
groups – either pre-formed groups that outside NGOs and government could work 
with, or groups of farmers themselves who help to promote organic farming. In Ubon 
Ratchathani case, these urban activists seem to be doing most of the initiating. While 
some farmers are receptive to shifting into organic rice, significant barriers remain. 
Convincing farming appears to be quite labor intensive, and given the prevalence in 
use of chemical fertilizers, this is an uphill fight. Although the two main players we 
met with do help with technical assistance, provide funds for the certification process, 
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and even have schemes through which farmers can make money before they are fully 
certified, there are many barriers that they do not appear capable of surmounting.  
The (lack of a) role of the provincial government 
 
In Surin and Yasothon, the provincial government has stepped in to play some much-
needed roles. However, far from being a mechanism to support farmers shifting to 
organic rice, the role of the government in Ubon Ratchathani has been largely passive 
until recently. First, like Si-Saket, Ubon Ratchathani governors have been frequently 
switched in and out of the province. Until 2016, none have taken up the mantle of 
promoting organic rice. Officials in the provincial agricultural ministry responsible for 
promoting organic rice have said their efforts remained sporadic until this past year 
due to a severe lack of funding – their budget limited his office to reach out to a few 
dozen farmers annually. While the scale of the government’s efforts has been small, 
activists say that elements of the government have nevertheless provided a few 
supportive services. For instance, as the journalist aspired to open a green market, 
the provincial-level grassroots department helped introduce her to counterparts in 
Surin and Yasothon provinces. 
The provincial government’s passive role seems to be changing. In 2014, the 
provincial annual meeting focused on the deteriorating health of farmers. A gathering 
of health care professionals, hospitals and others both in the government and non-
government section concluded that the overuse of chemical fertilizers was to blame. 
The government has since intensified its role in promoting organic rice production by 
organizing fieldtrips for farmers to study from neighboring farmers, helping support 
the production of organic fertilizers and equipment used in organic farming, and 
assisting farmers through the certification requirement. They help connect farmers 
with external markets. In spite of this shift, the first three years were under-funded. 
Now that Bangkok is promoting the production of organic rice, the official finally 
received enough budget to play a role, reaching out to farmers and promoting the 
development of organic rice. The budget of the provincial office responsible for 
promoting organic rice suddenly ballooned to Baht 10 million.  
The overall goal remains quite modest – Ubon Ratchathani is playing catch up and 
thus aiming to increase the land coverage of organic rice to one percent, or 58,000 
rai.3 Despite the past few years of effort, the goal is only halfway fulfilled. Even as 
farmers remain uncertain about the prospects for organic rice production, the 
premium price for organic rice is narrowing. Meanwhile, the government is 
scrambling to connect organic rice farmers with external markets.  
Conclusions 
 
While these initiatives should be applauded, these promotors face an uphill battle. 
One of the major barriers cited by activists is that, decades ago, the government 
promoted the production of cassava, a plant used to make tapioca. Now in Ubon 
Ratchathani, some 200,000 rai of land is used for both rice and cassava. Farmers 
and government officials both argue that cassava is highly dependent on the use of 
chemical fertilizers. Because Cassava and rice are grown in the same field, the use of 
                                                          
3 1 rai = 0.16 hectares 
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chemical fertilizers quickly spread to the production of rice, such that now the use of 
chemicals in farming is nearly 99 percent. Moreover, the introduction of cassava 
introduced new pests that consumed rice, requiring the increase use of chemical 
pesticides. Moreover, government established shops aggressively promote the use of 
chemical fertilizers, and uses chemical fertilizers as a primary response to natural 
disasters – the government sends chemical fertilizer as a way to help farmers 
suffering from floods or pest epidemics. One interviewee suggested that farmers 
generally must first be personally affected by problems related to using chemical 
fertilizer – such as deteriorating health or water contamination – before they would be 
willing to consider producing organic rice.  
The initiatives of those promoting organic rice in Ubon Ratchathani seem set to 
continue and intensify. However, they face an uphill battle. Despite trying in recent 
years, little headway has been made. Organic rice farmers remain few in number and 
are disperse. Unlike the most successful cases of Surin and Yasothon, there is little 
involvement of outside NGOs and the government has been passive until recently. 
Moreover, Ubon Ratchathani lacks the foundation of bottom-up organized farmers 
groups. To be sure, the experience province of Amnat Charoen has shown that 
positive results can result despite the lack of these factors. However, unlike the 
efforts of non-government actors Amnat Charoen, the activities in Ubon Ratchathani 
are rarely spurred by farmers themselves, and appear to be largely top-down and elite 
lead.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have investigated factors that may have helped small farms upgrade 
into organic rice production in Northeastern Thailand. We identified several 
upgrading challenges embedded in a shift into higher value portions of this 
alternative global value chain and explored the potential roles of local, regional, 
national, and international NGOs in helping farmers to overcome these challenges. In 
doing so, we paid special attention to the possible role of local government in serving 
as a catalyst for ‘scaling up’ the assistance that community groups and NGOs can 
provide to farmers seeking to upgrade. 
 Table 3: Key actors in each province  
 
 
GROUP YASOTHON SURIN AMNAT 
CHOERN 
UBON 
RACHATHANI 
SISAKET 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
 x x  (not until 
recently) 
  
FARMERS 
GROUPS 
x x x   
COMMUNITY 
NGOS 
 x  x  x x x 
PROVINCIAL 
NGOS 
 x x   x   
NATIONAL NGOS  x x      
INTERNATIONAL 
NGOS 
 x x      
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For Yasothon and Surin, it is clear that local governors, untethered via Thaksin’s 
CEO Governor program from the restrictions of working within a unitary state, gave 
local community groups and farmers groups important forms of support, facilitating 
the increase in the production of organic rice. This has led to tremendous success not 
only in producing organic rice, but also processing the rice, building relationships 
with international buyers, and developing their own brands and standards. In Amnat 
Charoen, local networks of producers have more recently pursued upgrading into 
organic production but that they have done so with minimal engagement with either 
national green NGOs or, until the last two years, provincial government. In Ubon 
Ratchathani and Si-Saket, any social capital that exists at the community level has 
not been effectively scaled up outside of the Santi Asoke network. With few local 
organizations to engage, the efforts of the provincial government, provincial NGOs, or 
national NGOs to mobilize organic rice production have been largely ineffective. Going 
forward, more detailed matching of local, provincial, and national NGO capacities on 
to the collective challenges of particular upgrading tasks in the organic value chain is 
necessary.  
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 YASOTHON SURIN AMNAT CHAROEN UBON RACHATHANI SISAKET 
KEY ACTORS Domestic NGOs; 
local civil society; 
provincial leaders 
Domestic NGOs; 
local civil society; 
provincial leaders 
Local civil society Small number of local 
actors; Buddhist sect 
Small number of local 
actors; Buddhist sect 
COST OF 
TRANSITION 
Community 
Subsidies 
National NGOs Local farmers’ groups Local activists Organic rice 
traditionally practiced 
by members of 
Buddhist Sect 
COST OF 
CERTIFICATION 
Groups of 
Cooperatives 
Green Net 
Alternative 
Agriculture 
Network 
Green Net 
Groups (Gov more 
recently) 
Nascent NGOs Main actors do not 
seek certification  
GLOBAL 
BUYERS 
Green Net Green Net 
Groups of 
Cooperatives 
No initiative No initiative No initiative 
BUILDING 
DOMESTIC 
BRAND 
National NGOs with 
farmers’ groups 
National NGOs 
with farmers’ 
groups 
Groups of        No initiative 
Cooperatives 
No initiative 
MILLING 
PROVISION 
Government 
Provincial Network 
Surin Rice Fund & 
Assembly of the 
Poor 
Groups of 
Cooperatives 
Local Farmers Groups Local activists No initiative  
SKILL 
TRANSFER - 
FARMING 
Provincial Network 
Temples 
Local Government 
Local Government 
Temples 
Provincial Network 
Groups of 
Cooperatives 
Contract Farming 
Small NGOs 
Passed down via sect 
members, both within 
sect farms and across 
provinces 
SKILL 
TRANSFER - 
AUDITING 
Groups of 
Cooperatives 
Green Net 
Surin Rice Fund Provincial Network 
Local Government 
 No formal auditing 
Table 4: Key actors in each province for each upgrading task 
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While the results of this research have implications for the theoretical literature 
regarding both development/agrarian change and collective action, it also makes two 
contributions to debates within the study of Thai politics. First, despite the fact that 
Thailand is a unitary state, governors seem to have played a major role. This is all the 
more important since scholars are skeptical that even the Thaksin-era efforts to 
decentralize power to “CEO governors” had much positive effect (e.g., Mutebi 2004; 
Haque 2010). While these results do not contradict those general conclusions, we 
have documented a few cases in which provincial governors made a significant 
difference, especially during the Thaksin administration. Second, many Thai scholars 
argue that attempts to support agriculture in Thailand retards the overall 
modernization of the economy. Such politically-motivated efforts delay the transition 
of farmers to industrial farm workers. This in turn causes them to be trapped in low-
income, low-productivity agrarian activities (e.g., Walker 2012; Ricks 2016). Our 
findings would suggest, by contrast, that certain forms of promoting agriculture – 
such as shifting to organic rice production – can help Thai farmers increase their 
incomes and modernize agriculture in a way that allows Thai farmers to benefit.  
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